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Abstract
Welfare maximisation is constrained by the ultimate frontier of efficient allocations, with a unique,
interior optimum. By the second welfare theorem, such an optimum depends on a specific wealth
distribution out of innumerable ones at given prices, whereby the state cannot refrain from redistributing.
Such has long been known by the profession, but it never received a mathematical formalisation, which
this article takes up. Building on the literature, this research also presents two simplified proofs to the
two welfare theorems and a mathematical formalisation of the resolution to the compromise between
equity and efficiency, for the additional constraint binds the social welfare function in equity and it
originates the ultimate possibility frontier in efficiency.
JEL classification codes: D31; D51; D61; D63; I31; I38; P46; P48.
MSC codes: 49K10; 60A99; 91B15; 91B50.
Keywords: competitive equilibrium; Pareto efficiency; political economy; social welfare; utility possibility;
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1. Introduction
There famously exist two fundamental theorems of welfare economics. The first welfare theorem dictates
that a price equilibrium with transfers in a complete market system is a feasible Pareto efficient allocation
(i.e. market capitalism); the second welfare theorem dictates that a feasible Pareto efficient allocation is a
price equilibrium with transfers in a complete market system (i.e. state capitalism). Both theorems are the
syntactic implication A −→ B = ¬A ∨ B, which is true even if antecedent A is false (i.e. no existential
fallacy); their failures, stressed by market and state socialism respectively together with their remedies,
therefore only mean that A is not guaranteed in order to yield B (i.e. no counterexample, negative or
inverse error singly taken): in the first case the state has an allocative role to guarantee market completeness
and full employment; in the second case the state has a redistributive role to ensure the feasible Pareto
efficient allocation optimising social welfare, because the social welfare function is constrained by the Pareto
set and their mathematical structure yields a unique, interior optimum. In positive terms, however, market
completion, business cycle stabilisation and wealth redistribution are difficult and knowledge of the optimal
allocation and its necessary price enforcement are equally improbable.
The two welfare theorems are not therefore strictly concerned with welfare, but with efficiency, notes
Fenoaltea (2001) especially, for the feasible Pareto efficient allocation of interest is exogenous: a feasible
Pareto efficient allocation can be reached through exchange in a complete market system at fixed prices,
preceded by wealth redistribution, but which one is it to be? The answer is only the one optimising social
welfare. Such a reflexion triggers a welfare theorem of its own, which the profession has long known, see
Bator (1952), but which lacks a mathematical formalisation, as proven by the encyclopaedic references
Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Jehle and Reny (2010), Kreps (2012) and Varian (1992). Fenoaltea (2001)
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presented it more or less thus: if initial wealth redistribution is decentralised at given prices then the
probability of selecting the initial level of wealth distribution optimising social welfare is infinitesimal; we
formalise it mathematically and following him we call it the theorem of political economy.
Before doing so let us recall Fenoaltea (2001)’s remarks: market capitalism can at most yield efficiency,
not welfare optimality, unlike state capitalism on contemplating our theorem; the object of redistribution is
wealth because the optimal allocation is not known, which wealth redistribution can be unjust, we add. We
in fact specify that because wealth redistribution is about aggregate utility optimisation, not unjustified
egalitarianism, such an optimisation cannot be utilitarian, but ethical, which means it need not happen.
We further note two points. Firstly, centralised transfers for the known feasible Pareto efficient allocation,
whereby the market is avoided, are improbable as well as contradictory, because even if impossible for the
direct achievement of the known feasible Pareto efficient allocation they would still be needed for its initial
wealth redistribution. Secondly, state socialism conceptually resolves the second welfare theorem failure
just as market socialism resolves the first’s, providing knowledge of the feasible Pareto efficient allocation
optimising social welfare, therefore, state socialism allows state capitalism to function, as sociologically
understood.
2. Structure
In this section we lay out the building blocks for the mathematical formalisation of the political economy
theorem following Mas-Colell et al. (1995), presenting direct proofs to the two welfare theorems in the
process, with attendant remarks.
Let {Xi, %i}
I
i=1 ⊂ R
K be a consumption set and preferences sequence with regard to I consumers,
{Yj}
J
j=1 ⊂ R
K a production set sequence with regard to J producers and e = [e1, . . . , eK ]
⊤
⊂ RK a
K dimensional vector of initial endowments, relative to K real commodities. Preferences are complete
and transitive and production is non-empty and closed: ∀ {zn}
∞
n=1 ⊂ R
K , z1 %i z2 ∨ z2 %i z1 and z1 %i
z2 ∧ z2 %i z3 −→ z1 %i z3; Y j =
{
y ∈ RK : ∀ {yjn}
∞
n=1 ⊂ Yj , yjn → y
}
6= {} . Individual consumption
and production vectors xi = [x1i, . . . , xKi]
⊤
∈ Xi ⊂ R
K and yj = [y1j , . . . , yKj ]
⊤
∈ Yj ⊂ R
K form
the allocation (x, y) = (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ) ∈ X1 × . . . ×XI × Y1 × . . . × YJ = X × Y. Preference
characteristics are famously captured by household utility functions homogeneous of degree one, continuous,
increasing and concave in consumption: u : X → RI , where X =
{
x : x ∈ RKI
}
, such that U =
u (x) ; ∀α ∈ R, u (αx) = αu (x) , u ∈ C2 (X) , u′ (x) > 0 and u′′ (x) < 0. The same holds for production
and firm production functions.
A feasible allocation is such that aggregate consumption equals aggregate production: a ={
(x, y) ∈ X × Y ⊂ RK(I+J) :
∑I
i=1 xi = e+
∑J
j=1 yj
}
. For any K dimensional price vector p =
[p1, . . . , pK ]
⊤
⊂ RK , aggregate wealth is the sum of individual wealths, namely, aggregate consump-
tion weighted at given prices, which is the sum of the initial endowment and aggregate production weighted
at given prices:
∑I
i=1wi =
∑I
i=1 p
⊤xi = p
⊤e+
∑J
j=1 p
⊤yj . Centralised transfers happen by redistributing
priced endowments and production. A feasible allocation is Pareto efficient if and only if there exists no
other feasible allocation such that almost all agents prefer it to the given one and at least one agent strictly
prefers it to the given one: a˜ ←→6 ∃a′ such that, 6 ∀i, a′i %i ai and, ∃i, a
′
i ≻i ai. The Pareto set is the
collection of all feasible Pareto efficient allocations: A˜ =
{
a˜ : a˜ ∈ X˜ × Y˜ ⊂ RK(I+J)
}
. For consumption,
preferences, production, initial endowments and wealth, a price equilibrium with transfers is an allocation
and a non-zero price vector pair such that profits and preferences are optimal and markets clear: (a∗, p 6= 0)
such that (i) ∀y′j ∈ Yj , p
⊤y∗j ≥ p
⊤y′j , (ii) x
∗
i ≻i x
′
i, where x
∗
i , x
′
i ∈ B
(
p⊤
)
=
{
x′i ∈ Xi : wi ≥ p
⊤x′i
}
,
and (iii)
∑I
i=1 x
∗
i = e+
∑J
j=1 y
∗
j .
The first welfare theorem dictates that a price equilibrium with transfers in a complete market system
is a feasible Pareto efficient allocation: (a∗, p 6= 0) −→ a˜∗. It can be proven directly. There exists a
consumption vector optimising preferences for optimal profits and all agents, therefore, it is preferred to all
the others and the feasible allocation supporting it is Pareto efficient; formally:
∑I
i=1 x
∗
i = e+
∑J
j=1 y
∗
j ≻
e +
∑J
j=1 y
′
j =
∑I
i=1 x
′
i for
∑I
i=1 p
⊤x∗i = p
⊤e +
∑J
j=1 p
⊤y∗j > p
⊤e +
∑J
j=1 p
⊤y′j =
∑I
i=1 p
⊤x′i and
a∗ =
{
(x∗, y∗) ∈ X × Y ⊂ RK(I+J) :
∑I
i=1 x
∗
i = e+
∑J
j=1 y
∗
j
}
, therefore, 6 ∃a′ such that, 6 ∀i, a′i %i a
∗
i
and, ∃i, a′i ≻i a
∗
i . We remark that the use of locally non-satiated preferences is unnecessary, because one
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need not hypothesise a feasible Pareto dominating allocation automatically embedding a contradictory
consumption vector optimising preferences.
The second welfare theorem dictates that a feasible Pareto efficient allocation is a price equilibrium
with transfers in a complete market system: a˜ −→ (a˜∗, p 6= 0) . It can be likewise proven directly. There
exists no feasible Pareto dominating allocation, therefore, it must embed a consumption vector optimising
preferences for optimal profits and all agents; formally: 6 ∃a′ such that, 6 ∀i, a′i %i a
∗
i and, ∃i, a
′
i ≻i a
∗
i and
a∗ =
{
(x∗, y∗) ∈ X × Y ⊂ RK(I+J) :
∑I
i=1 x
∗
i = e+
∑J
j=1 y
∗
j
}
, therefore,
∑I
i=1 x
∗
i = e +
∑J
j=1 y
∗
j ≻
e+
∑J
j=1 y
′
j =
∑I
i=1 x
′
i for
∑I
i=1 p
⊤x∗i = p
⊤e+
∑J
j=1 p
⊤y∗j > p
⊤e+
∑J
j=1 p
⊤y′j =
∑I
i=1 p
⊤x′i. Observe
that locally non-satiated preferences are similarly unnecessary. We additionally recall Maskin and Roberts
(2007)’s remark: convex production sets (and preferences) are unnecessary for both the second welfare
theorem and the existence of a price equilibrium with transfers (e.g. in large non-atomic economies they
are unnecessary for its existence). Specifically, the second welfare theorem’s historic proof uses convex
production sets and preferences only to derive existence of a price quasi-equilibrium with transfers, not to
show that a true antecedent implies a true consequent, therefore, we note, if the consequent is true through
convex production sets and preferences then the second welfare theorem holds trivially. Maskin and Roberts
(2007) also remarked that a counterexample to the second welfare theorem is a sufficient condition for the
inexistence of any price quasi-equilibrium with transfers: by definition, a feasible Pareto efficient allocation
embeds a consumption vector optimising preferences for optimal profits and all agents, thus, if such an
optimisation were impossible then the defined notion of an equilibrium would not exist at all.
There exists a transformation of the Pareto set into multidimensional, real household utility: t : A˜→ U,
where U =
{
u : u ∈ RI
}
, such that T = t (a˜) . It is homogeneous of degree one, continuous and increasing
in the Pareto set elements. The utility possibility frontier follows from the Pareto set through a function
composition, because each household presents a maximal utility level given those of others, matching
the notion of Pareto efficiency; more clearly, the utility possibility frontier maps household utility to the
non-negative real line: f ◦ t : A˜→ R+; f : U → R+ such that F = f (u) . It is homogeneous of degree one,
continuous, increasing and convex in utility: f ′′ (u) > 0, all else equal. The social welfare function maps
household utility to the non-negative real line: s : U → R+ such that S = s (u) . It is homogenous of degree
one, continuous, increasing and concave in utility: s′′ (u) < 0, all else equal. Social welfare optimisation
is the maximisation of the social welfare function with respect to utility subject to the utility possibility
frontier; social welfare function concavity and utility possibility frontier convexity are famously sufficient,
but unnecessary, conditions for a unique, interior optimum: max
u
s (u) s.t. f (u) and n (Uo) = 1, where
Uo =
{
uo : uo ∈ R
I
}
.
3. Theorem
In this section we formalise the political economy theorem mathematically; we further mathematically
formalise the notion of the ultimate possibility frontier following Fenoaltea (2001), resolving the equity
efficiency compromise in the process.
The social welfare optimum is a unique tangency point between the social welfare function and the
utility possibility frontier and it is a feasible allocation along the Pareto set. A feasible allocation is such
that aggregate consumption equals the initial endowment plus aggregate production; priced aggregate
consumption is wealth, whereby price changes vary the angle at which the wealth hyperplane crosses the
Pareto set. A probability density function with individual consumption vectors as arguments models the
probability of randomly selecting an initial level of wealth distribution at given prices: for the probability
space (Ω, X, π) , where Ω is the sample space, X =
{
x : x ∈ RKI
}
⊂ RKI = P (Ω) is the σ-algebra and
π : X → [0, 1] is the probability measure, P = π (x) ≥ 0 and
∫∞
−∞
π (x) dx = 1.
By the second welfare theorem, a feasible Pareto efficient allocation can be reached by exchange in a
complete market system at fixed prices given an initial level of wealth distribution. The feasible Pareto
efficient allocation optimising social welfare is contingent on an initial level of wealth distribution at given
prices and since a specific initial level of wealth distribution is infinitesimal the probability that it result
through decentralisation is also infinitesimal: since the initial level of wealth distribution is modelled
through an aggregate consumption vector taken from the real hyperplane at fixed prices the probability
that a specific one result randomly is zero.
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Theorem 3.1 (Political economy theorem) Let wˆ = p⊤xˆ be an arbitrary level of initial wealth
redistribution. If initial wealth redistribution is not centralised at fixed prices then the probability of selecting
the initial level of wealth distribution optimising social welfare is zero. Formally:
w 6=C wˆ|p −→ P (w = wo) = 0.
Proof. The proof is direct. If wealth redistribution is not centralised at fixed prices then the probability
that the initial level of wealth distribution equal the one optimising social welfare is the integral of the
aggregate consumption probability density function evaluated at the point optimising social welfare, which
is zero; formally: w = p¯⊤x, therefore, P (w = wo) = P
(
p¯⊤x = p¯⊤xo
)
= P
(
p¯⊤x ∈
[
p¯⊤xo, p¯
⊤xo
])
=
P
(
x ∈ [xo, xo] |p
⊤
)
=
∫ xo
xo
π (x) dx = |φ (x) |xoxo = φ (xo)− φ (xo) = 0. 
The reason for which the converse is not stated is clear from contrapositive of the converse (i.e. inverse
denial), namely, if initial wealth redistribution is centralised at fixed prices then the probability of selecting
the initial level of wealth distribution optimising social welfare need not be non-zero, as another initial
level of wealth distribution could result, intentionally and not; formally: w =C wˆ|p 6−→ P (w = wo) 6= 0.
Corollary 3.2 If the probability of selecting the initial level of wealth distribution optimising social
welfare is non-zero then the arbitrary level of initial wealth redistribution equals the initial level of wealth
distribution optimising social welfare. Formally:
P (w = wo) 6= 0 −→ wˆ = wo.
Proof. The proof is a tautology of Theorem 3.1’s contrapositive. Theorem 3.1’s contrapositive dictates
that if the probability of selecting the initial level of wealth distribution optimising social welfare is
non-zero then initial wealth redistribution is centralised at fixed prices: P (w = wo) 6= 0 −→ w =C wˆ|p. It
follows that the arbitrary level of initial wealth redistribution equals the initial level of wealth distribution
optimising social welfare, namely, the one centrally selected: wo = w =C wˆ. 
Figure 1: Social welfare optimum
O1
O2x2
x1
a˜∗o
eeo
PS
B
(
p⊤
)
%
p
s, f
u1
u2
a˜∗o
(u1, u2)o
SWF
UPF
Note. The first diagram is a pure exchange Edgeworth box with two agents, O1 and O2, and two consumptions, x1 and x2 : tangency
points between preferences % at given budget constraint B
(
p
⊤
)
, to which prices p are orthogonal, are Pareto set PS; the budget
constraint’s slope is price ratio
p2
p1
. Social welfare optimum a˜∗
o
is a specific feasible Pareto efficient allocation, reached at specific
initial wealth wo = p
⊤
xo = p
⊤
eo and fixed prices: if initial wealth does not yield the social welfare optimum through trade along
the budget constraint’s slope in a complete market system then the state can redistribute it by shifting the budget constraint at a
constant slope from w = p⊤x = p⊤e to wo = p
⊤
xo = p
⊤
eo. The second diagram is a three dimensional graph of social welfare
function SWF and of utility possibility frontier UPF with the same agents. The social welfare optimum, at specific initial wealth
wo = p
⊤
xo = p
⊤
eo and fixed prices in a complete, efficient market system, is the tangency point between the two manifolds. The
probability of randomly selecting the initial wealth optimising social welfare is zero: P (wo) = P
(
p¯
⊤
eo
)
= P
(
xo|p
⊤
)
= 0. The
diagrams are not to scale.
A partially more binding constraint than the utility possibility frontier for the social welfare function
is such that the new tangency point between the acting social welfare function and the new constraint
(i.e. second best) excludes both the former social welfare optimum and tangent allocations with lower
social welfare levels on the binding segment of the utility possibility frontier. More clearly, the ultimate
utility possibility frontier is the union of the binding segments of the new constraint and the utility
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possibility frontier about their point of intersection: new constraint function c is defined as f and,
∀d = c, f and u ∈ U such that U<u =
{
u : u ∈
(
R
I\G
)
⊂ RI
}
, where G ⊂ RI is a set subtrahend,
and U≥u = U\U<u, d<u : U<u → R+, d≥u : U≥u → R+, D<u = {d<u (u) : d<u (u) ∈ R+} and
D≥u = {d≥u (u) : d≥u (u) ∈ R+} , therefore, F
′ = min {F<u, C<u} ∪min {F≥u, C≥u} .
The fact that the second best has a higher social welfare level than the tangent allocations on the
binding utility possibility frontier means there semantically exists no equity efficiency compromise: the
second best is meaningfully efficient and Pareto efficiency is only Pareto stability by which exchange no
longer happens. The equity efficiency compromise exists neither effectively, because the second best is the
tangency point between the social welfare function and the new constraint, making it equitable (in that
it optimises social welfare), and it is also the tangency point between the social welfare function and the
ultimate utility possibility frontier, making it efficient (in that it accounts for Pareto efficiency). Such an
observation is due to Fenoaltea (2001). Fenoaltea (2001) also added that perduring market equilibria are
Pareto efficient and whenever not recognised as such they allude to unidentified binding constraints along
which utilities have been maximised: it seems true, however prevaricating such further constraints be.
Figure 2: Ultimate utility possibility frontier
u2
u1
a˜∗o
a˜∗
o
′(u1, u2)o
(u1, u2)o′
SWF
UPF
AC
Note. Such a diagram graphs social welfare functions SWF, utility possibility frontier UPF and additional constraint AC with two
agents in two dimensions, omitting the axis of the codomain. The diagram displays the ultimate utility possibility frontier, which is
the binding union of the additional constraint and the utility possibility frontier; it highlights both the equity and efficiency of new
social welfare optimum a˜∗
o
′ : equity because tangency point between the acting social welfare function and the binding additional
constraint; efficiency because tangency point between the acting social welfare function and the ultimate utility possibility frontier.
The diagram is not to scale.
4. Conclusion
Efficient allocations are competitive equilibria at given wealth and prices, but welfare is maximised subject
to the ultimate frontier of efficient allocations, with a unique, interior optimum; the efficient allocation
optimising welfare reached as a competitive equilibrium at given prices thus requires a specific wealth
distribution, which cannot systematically arise unless it be centrally determined: if wealth redistribution
is decentralised at given prices then the probability of optimising welfare is infinitesimal. Such is the
political economy theorem long known by the profession, now formalised mathematically. Finally, whichever
additional constraint were to bind the social welfare function would tautologically give rise to an equitable
allocation, but also to an efficient one, for then partaking in the ultimate possibility frontier of the economy
and settling the compromise.
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